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PROPERTY RIGHTS-ARE THERE ANY?
CHARLES J. BLOCi*
The Constitution of the United States was, to me, like a
cathedral. In it and by it property rights and personal rights were
defined and protected. Now, it is being torn down.
New, so-called rights are being "written-in." Those which
were included in it are being destroyed. Developments have been
such that the question is seriously propounded:
"Property Rights: Are There Any?"
I. THE LAW PRIOR TO THE CONSTITUTION
There were. Individuals had rights as to their property just as
they had as to their lives and liberty. The Magna Carta provided
that no freeman should be imprisoned, dispossessed, banished or de-
stroyed "excepting by the legal judgment of his peers or by the
laws of the land."1  In 1354, Parliament declared that no man
should be put out of land or tenement, nor taken, nor imprisoned, nor
disinherited, nor put to death, without being brought in answer by
due process of law.2 These were the English concepts of rights-
those of property and those of person on a parity.
English precedent played an essential part in the early history
of American constitutional development. The Magna Carta espe-
cially came to be regarded by the colonists, the great majority of
whom came from England, as a generic term for all documents of
constitutional significance. The Virginia Charter of 1606 estab-
lished the principle that the American colonists were entitled to the
rights of Englishmen. 3 The Charter of Massachusetts Bay4 so pro-
* Member of the Georgia Bar.
'MAGNA CARTA ch. 39 (1215).
2 Statute of Westminster of the Liberties of London, 1354, 28 Edw. 3,
c. 3.
'VA. CHAR. (1606). The Charter provided in part that: "Also we do
... DECLARE .. . that all and every the Persons being our Subjects, which
shall dwell and inhabit within every or any of the said several Colonies and
Plantations . . . shall HAVE and enjoy all Liberties, Franchises, and Im-
munities ... as if they had been abiding and born, within thus our Realm of
England, or any other of our said Dominions."
' MAss. BAY CHARi. (1629). The Charter provided in part "that all
and every the Subiects of Vs ... which shall goe to and inhabite within the
saide Landes and Premisses hereby menc6ed to be graunted ... shall have
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vided. So did that of Maryland.5  The Massachusetts Body of
Liberties' in the first section thereof protected life, liberty and estate.
Expressed in the words of that day, "no mans goods or estate
shall be taken away from him, nor any way indamaged under coulor
of law or Countenance of Authoritie, unless it be by vertue or equitie
of some expresse law of the Country waranting the same, established
by a generall Court and sufficiently published.-...7
When the First Continental Congress met it relied also on Eng.
lish history, declaring:
[T]hat the inhabitants of the English colonies in North-America,
by the immutable laws of nature, the principles of the English
constitution, and the several charters or compacts, have the
following RIGHTS: Resolved, N.C.D. 1. That they are entitled
to life, liberty and property: and they have never ceded to any
foreign power whatever, a right to dispose of either without
their consent."
Following the Declaration of Independence the first Constitution
of Pennsylvania provided:
That every member of society hath a right to be protected
in the enjoyment of life, liberty and property .... But no part
of a man's property can be justly taken from him, or applied
to public uses, without his own consent.....
There were similar provisions in the Delaware Declaration of
Rights,10 Constitution of Maryland," of North Carolina,' 2 of Ver-
mont,' 3 Massachusetts, 4 and New Hampshire. 5
and enjoy all liberties and Immunities of free and naturall Subiects within
any of the Domynions of Vs . . . as yf they and everie of them were borne
within the Realme of England."
'MD. CHAR. (1632). The Charter provided in part that "all Privileges,
Franchises and Liberties of this our Kingdom of England, freely, quietly, and
peaceable to have and possess, and the same may use and enjoy in the same
manner as our Leige-Men born, or to be born, within our said Kingdom of
England...."
MASS. BODY OF LinmnRs (1641).
MASS. BODY OF LIBERTIES art. I (1641).
'FIRST CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, DECLARATIONS AND RESOLvEs art. I
(1774).
'Pa. Const. art. VIII (1776).
0 DE. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 10 (1776).
" MD. CONsT. art. XXI (1776).
" N.C. CONST. art. XII (1776).
'VT. CONST. art. IX (1777).
"MAss. CONST. art. X (1780).
"N.H. CoNsT. art. XII (1784).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Thus, by 1789 when the Convention which adopted the Consti-
tution assembled, a fundamental principle of law as recognized for
five centuries by the English speaking people who colonized this
country, freed it from the tyranny of the British King, and estab-
lished governments for their protection had been firmly established.
Life, liberty, and property had been and were equally entitled to the
protection of an established government. If the public good de-
manded it, after trial by jury, man forfeited his life, or was shorn
of his liberty. Again, if the public good demanded it, after proper
trial and just compensation, a man could be shorn of his property or
his property rights. But no one of the three cardinal rights was
subordinate to the other.
II. THE CONSTITUTION
The framers of the Constitution had great respect for property
and the rights of owners of property. Although the preamble makes
no specific reference as such, the Constitution itself abounds with
provisions respecting property and the rights attaching to it.16
The first ten amendments-the Bill of Rights-sought again to
protect property rights as well as personal rights. The third amend-
ment protects the houses of people. 7 The fourth amendment pro-
tects the people as to their houses, papers and effects as well as their
persons.' The fifth amendment protects life, liberty and property,
11 The framers knew, for instance, when they prescribed the qualifications
for those who were to choose the members of the House of Representatives
that at least one of the states had among its qualifications the payment of
taxes, or the ownership of property. GA. CoNsT. art. IX (1777). They were
careful to provide for uniformity as to taxation (U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 9),
duties (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8), imports (U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8), and
excises (U.S. CoNsT. art. I, §8). They recognized slaves as property
(U.S. CoNsT. art. I §§ 1, 9; U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 2). They guarded rights
in commerce among the ports of the several states (U.S. CoNsT. art. I,
§ 9). They sought to protect withdrawals of money from the Treasury of the
United States (U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 9). They sought soundness in the
financial structure by providing that no state should make anything but gold
and silver coin a tender in payment of debts (U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 10),
but it seemed not to have occurred to them to make a similar provision as to
the United States. Lastly they sought to protect the sanctity of contracts by
forbidding the States to impair them (U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10).
"' "No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without
the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be pre-
scribed by law." U.S. CoNsT. amend. III.
"3 "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
[Vol. 42
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and specifically forbids the taking of private property for public
use without just compensation.' 9  The seventh amendnient pi'o-
tects the right of trial by jury in cases involving property just as-
the sixth does in cases involving life or liberty.2 9 " '0 . .
With the adoption of the thirteenth anendment,:ptoperty rights'
began to be jeopardized. 21 Property was taken-without due process,
of law. The jeopardy was entirely sectional, so no one outside of
the South was greatly concerned.
So far as the supreme law of the land, as written, was concerned,
property rights were on a parity with personal rights. Due process
protected property as well as person. Neither property nor person
could be subjected to unlawful seizure.22  Where property was in-
volved, a litigant was just as much entitled to a trial by jury as when
his life or liberty was involved.23
III. PROPERTY
What is "property"? In its strict legal sense, "property" signi-
fies that dominion or indefinite right of user, control and disposition
which one may lawfully exercise, over particular things or objects.
As so used, the yord signifies the sum of all the rights and powers
incident to ownership._
So defined, property is composed of certain constituent elements,
to wit, the unrestricted right of use, enjoyment, and disposal of the
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized."- U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
" "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise in-
fainous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of' a Grand Jury, except
in. cages arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service in time-of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for
the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be de-
prived of Aife, :liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S.
CONST. amend V.
I 2' "In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried
by- a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States,
than according to the rules of the common law." U.S: CONST. amend. VII.
- ' 'Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within
the United, States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." .U.S.&osT.
amend. XIII, §-1.
"U.S. CoNssT. amend. IV.'
"U.S. CoNsT. amend. VII.
,Nashville, C. & St. L.R.R. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249 (1933).
f9631
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particular subject of property.25  Owners of real estate have the
right under the Constitution to use, lease and dispose of it for
lawful purposes. 26 _The right of free and untrammeled use for
legitimate purposes is fundamental and within the protection of the
Federal Constitution. Whatever physical interference annuls this
right takes "property." The right or element of user necessarily in-
cludes the right and power of excluding others from using the sub-
ject of property.27
A. Effect of Taxation
The South may have thought that it was getting even for the
passage of the thirteenth amendment when fifty or so years later it
sponsored the adoption of the sixteenth amendment and its pro-
vision for unlimited taxation of incomes.28 The statesmen of that
day utterly failed to realize that they were sounding not only the
death knell of the rights reserved to the states by the tenth amend-
ment but were also laying the foundation for the complete de-
struction of all property rights. The effect of this amendment is
shown in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.21 where the
Supreme Court of the United States stated that: "A tax upon one's
whole income is a tax upon the annual receipts from his property,
and as such falls within the same class as a tax upon that prop-
erty ... ."3o
There can be no quarrel with the right to tax incomes under the
Constitution as now amended. There can be serious quarrel though,
when the government extracts money from some citizens for
the benefit of others, domestic and foreign, without any right given
to test the validity of the use by the United States of the funds so
"42 Am. JuR. Property § 4 (1942).
2" Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923).
"' Chicago & W.I.R.R. v. Englewood Connecting R.R., 115 Ill. 375, 4
N.E. 246 (1886); Vanderlip v. Grand Rapids, 73 Mich. 522, 41 N.W. 677
(1889); St. Louis v. Hill, 116 Mo. 527, 22 S.W. 861 (1893); Appeal of
Perrin, 305 Pa. 42, 156 Atl. 305 (1931); Bryson v. McShane, 48 W. Va. 126,
35 S.E. 848 (1900).
2" "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes,
from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several
states, and without regard to any census or enumeration." U.S. CoNsT.
amend. XVI.
2 158 U.S. 601 (1895). This case was decided prior to the passage of
the sixteenth amendment and held that an income tax, passed by Lincoln to
finance war, was a direct tax under the Constitution, and therefore unconsti-
tutional.
30 Id. at 625.
[Vol. 42
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extracted. Exemplifying this problem is the case of Massachusetts
v. Mellon.31
One of the first of the social security acts was the Federal Act
of November 23, 1921.2 Commonly called the Maternity Act it
sought to provide funds to reduce maternal and infant mortality and
protect the health of mothers and infants. The Commonwealth of
Massachusetts and Harriet A. Frothingham brought separate actions
against Andrew W. Mellon, Secretary of the Treasury to restrain
the Secretary from enforcing the' act. The Supreme Court of the
United States held that Massachusetts had no standing to sue.
It also held that the taxpayer could not sue to enjoin the execution
of the act on the ground that it was invalid and would result in
taxation for illegal purposes. Thus the Social Security program of
the New Deal in the 1930's was practically immunized from legal
attack. Now, Federal statutes further immunize.3
B. Effect of Legislative Enactments
Since the adoption of the Constitution many statutory encroach-
ments on property rights have been in two general areas. One area
is that in which the owner has devoted his property to a use in
which the public has an interest. The other lacks the feature of
public interest. Sometimes the areas overlap. Sometimes the line
of demarcation is dimmed by judicial construction.
In 1876, it was held in an opinion by Chief Justice Waite that
when private property is devoted to public use it becomes subject
to public regulation.3 4 Thus, in the instant case, the state legislature
was authorized to fix by law the maximum charges for the storage
of grain in warehouses. It should be noted also that during this
same year the court held that railway companies were subject to
legislative control as to their rates of fare and freight.a5
The doctrine expanded with age. Laws passed for the sup-
pression of immorality, in the interest of health, to secure fair trade
practices, and to safeguard the interests of depositors in banks, were
found to be consistent with the due process clause of the fifth and
-- 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
"'Maternity Act ch. 135, 42 Stat. 224.
:'E.g., INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 7421.
s' Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
" Chicago B. & Q.R.R. v. Iowa, 94 U.S. 155 (1876).
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fourteenth amendments. 6 In Nebbia v. New York87 (which up-
held a New York milk control law) the Supreme Court said:
I It is clear that there is no closed class or category of busi-Inesses affected with a public interest, and the function of courts
in the, application of the Fifth and Fourteenth 'Amendments is
to determine in each case whether circumstances vindicate the
challenged regulation as a reasonable exertion of governmental
authority or condemn it as arbitrary or discriminatory. 88
So, in this-our government of laws-the only criterion as to
public interest is the judgment and opinion of whomsoever composes
the court. It is only a weak hope that another statement of Justice
Roberts speaking for the majority in Nebbia remains the "law of
the land." Said he: "The guaranty of due process.., demands only
that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and
that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to
the object sought to be attained."9
"The day is gone" when the Supreme Court "uses the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state
laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they
may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular
school of thought."4 It isn't the utility owners alone, it isn't alone
the owners of businesses deemed to be affected with a public in-
terest, it isn't those whose professions or businesses are subject to
the police power of the states or the general welfare of the people
who have been shorn of property rights.
:The Fair Labor Standards Act of 193841 requiring employers
to conform to the wage and hour requirements with respect to em-
ployees engaged in the production of goods which were thereafter
to be shipped in interstate commerce was held to be applicable to
a Georgia sawmill owner, and valid.4" To do this it was necessary
to overrule a decision of the court rendered twenty-three years
before.43
That same year Congress enacted the Agricultural Adjustment
,' For 'a list of these cases as of 1934 see 89 A.L.R. 1477-78 (1934).
A7 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
Id:-at 536.
, Id. at 525. (Emphasis added.)Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955).
'52 Stat. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C. §201 (1956).
'"United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
" Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
[Vol. 42.
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Act of 1938."4 The general scheme of it as related to wheat .was to
control the volume -moving in commerce in order to avoid surpluses
and shortages and the consequent abnormally low or high wheat
prices and obstructions to commerce. This piece of legislation gave
rise to the famous case of Wickard v. Filburn.45
Roscoe C. Filburn owned and operated a small farm in Mont-
gomery County, Ohio. He had a herd of dairy cattle, sold milk,
raised and sold poultry and eggs. He customarily raised a small
acreage of winter wheat, sold a portion of it, fed part of it to his
poultry and livestock on the farm, used some in making flour for
home consumption, and kept the rest for the following seeding.
He did not expressly state what he expected to do with his 1941
crop. The government established for that crop a wheat acreage
allotment of 11.1 acres and a normal yield of 20.1 bushels of wheat
to the acre. Although he was given notice of this allotment, he
sowed 23 acres, and harvested from his excess 11.9 acres 239
bushels. For the misdeed, the government penalized him $117.11
which he refused to pay. After prolonged litigation the Supreme
Court of the United States held the penalty valid since "Congress
may properly have considered that wheat consumed on the farm
where grown, if wholly outside the scheme of regulation, would
have a substantial effect in defeating and obstructing its purpose to
stimulate trade therein at increased prices."4 Therefore the penalty
under the act constituted a valid exercise of the power of Congress
to regulate commerce.
It is clear from the cases, only a few of which have been con-
sidered in this article, that when a state legislature or the Congress
enacts a law infringing or curtailing rights of property, a property
owner may expect no help from the courts. re holds his property,
and may use it, only as the legislatures may permit him so to do.
The fundamental rule that regulation of the use or enjoyment of
property rights can only be justified by the presence of public in-
terest seems now to be archaic. This is an ultra-modern develop-
ment of the law.
As previously pointed out the Constitution of the United States
was designed to protect property rights as well as personal rights.
The founding fathers knew that without property protected by the
"52 Stat. 31 (1938), 7 U.S.C. § 1281 (1952).
' 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
"1 Id. at 128-29.
19631
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law there would not long be any personal rights to be enjoyed. One
of the earliest adjudicated cases47 which is the foundation for estab-
lishing this principle is cited for holding that:
The right of property is a fundamental, natural, inherent,
and inalienable right. It is not ex gratia from the legislature,
but ex debito from the Constitution. In fact, it does not owe
its origin to the Constitutions which protect it, for it existed be-
fore them. It is sometimes characterized judicially as a sacred
right, the protection of which is one of the most important objects
of government. 48
The supreme court of my state has said: "The right of private
property is very sacred in the eye of the law. It stands on the same
foundation as the coordinate rights of personal liberty and personal
security."4
There is of course a great deal of difference between the right
of the states to regulate property and its use under their police power,
and the assumed right of the federal government under any of the
powers delegated to it by the states. The Supreme Court realized
and applied the "limitations" of the federal power in United States
v. Butler ° when considering the Agriculture Adjustment Act of
1933."' In the opinion nullifying the 1933 act, the following words
were in the opinion of Justice Roberts, in which Chief Justice
Hughes, and Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland and
Butler concurred:
A tax, in the general understanding of the term, and as used
in the Constitution, signifies an exaction for the support of the
Government. The word has never been thought to connote the
expropriation of money from one group for the benefit of an-
other. We may concede that the latter sort of imposition is
constitutional when imposed to effectuate regulation of a matter
in which both groups are interested and in respect of which there
is a power of legislative regulation. But manifestly no justifica-
tion for it can be found unless as an integral part of such regula-
tion. The exaction cannot be wrested out of its setting, de-
nominated an excise for raising revenue and legalized by ignoring
its purpose as a mere instrumentality for bringing about a desired
'
TVanhorne v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304 (1795).
,11 Am. JuR. Constitutional Law § 335 (1937). (Emphasis added.)
"Alabama Great So. R.R. v. Gilbert, 71 Ga. 591, 593 (1883).
"297 U.S. 1 (1936).
, Ch. 25, 48 Stat. 31.
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end. To do this would be to shut our eyes to what all others
than we can see and understand.
52
In the same opinion it was categorically stated that no power
"to regulate agricultural production is given" by the Constitution-
and therefore legislation by Congress for that purpose is for-
bidden. It is an established principle that the attainment of a
prohibited end may not be accomplished under the pretext of
the exertion of powers which are granted .... The power of
taxation, which is expressly granted, may, of course, be adopted
as a means to carry into operation another power also expressly
granted. But resort to the taxing power to effectuate an end
which is not legitimate, not within the scope of the Constitution,
is obviously inadmissible.
53
We are told that we should obey "established principles" of law.
Those "established principles" were not even mentioned by the
Supreme Court when, six years later, Wickard v. Filburn was
decided. Of course, then the Court was differently constituted.5 '
The mere composition of the Court, though, ought not to have
made any difference in the "established principle"-because ours is
a government of laws, not of men.
Despite the "established principle" of the Butler case, grants to
states for old-age assistance,55 and other forms of "social security" '56
were in 1937 held constitutional-sometimes by Courts sharply
divided. Zoning laws which hardly measured up to the rule that such
regulations, to be valid, must bear substantial relation to public
health, safety, morals or general welfare have been upheld.57
The fifth amendment provides in part: "nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation." It was an
established principle of constitutional law that even the right of
eminent domain did not authorize the taking of private property for
private use. It was an established principle, too, that the courts
297 U.S. at 61.
297 U.S. at 68-69.
8' Chief Justice Hughes, and Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds, Suther-
land and Butler were no longer a part of the Court. Justices Black, Reed,
Frankfurter, Douglas, Murphey and Jackson were. Justice Reed had been
Solicitor General when Butler was decided.
"Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 672 (1937); Allen v. Shelton, 96
F.2d 102 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 630 (1938).
:' See Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
5 7E.g., Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S.
116 (1928).
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have the power. -to determine .whether the use for which private
property is authorized by the legislature to be taken, is in fact a
public use."
In 1946, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Black, prac-
tically destroyed that principle.59 It established the rule that "when
Congress has spoken on this subject, 'its decision is entitled to
deference until it is shown to involve an, impossibility.' "0 Now,
it is held that the amendment does not prohibit Congressional legis-
lation to make the nation's capital beautiful as well as sanitary.0'
This case, too, is said to authorize the "taking from one businessman
for the benefit of another businessman."
It is today not an exaggeration to say that whatever law may
be enacted by a state under its police power which affects property
rights will be upheld.
Without much fear of exaggeration it could be asserted, too,
that under one guise or another the Supreme Court is building a
federal police power.
Maybe that federal power had commenced earlier than February
18, 1935. But it can safely be said that a decision of the Supreme
Court on that date formed the basis for an unlimited growth of that
power. The decision of the majority that day in the case of Norman
v. Baltimore & O.R.R."2 prompted Justice McReynolds to com-
mence a dissent with these words: "[I] f given effect, the enactments
here challenged will bring about confiscation of property rights and
repudiation of national obligations." 3  Concluding, he stated that:
"Loss of reputation for honorable dealing will bring us unending
humiliation; the impending legal and moral chaos is appalling."' 4
The enactments there challenged invalidated the so-called gold
clauses contained in bonds and other non-federal obligations. In
the "gold clauses," the promisor had promised to pay in "United
States gold coin of the present standard of value," or "of or equal to
the present standard of weight and fineness." Congress had by the
Joint Resolution of June 5, 1933,"5 invalidated these gold clauses,
-.158 City of Cincinnati y. Xfester, 281 U.S. 439, 446 (1930); Shoemaker
v United States, 147 U.S. 282, 298 (1893),.
" United States ex rel. TVA -v. Welch,' 327,U.S. 546 ,(1946).
"Id. at 552.
01 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954). -
"294 U.S. 240 (1935). ,
,Id. at 361.
"Id. at 381.
"48 Stat. 113 (1933), 31 U.S.C. §463 (1954).
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and permitted the discharge of the obligations upon payment in any
coin or currency which at the time of payment is legal tender for
public and private debts.
By a vote of 5 to 4, the power of Congress so to do was upheld.6"
The principal basis of the power asserted by Congress was held
to be that contained in article I, section 8,-"To coin money, regu-
late the value thereof, and of foreign coin."
The minority thought that this power could not be "so enlarged
as to authorize arbitrary action, whose immediate purpose and
necessary effect is destruction of individual rights."6" In vain they
cited Chief Justice Marshall's words in Fletcher v. Peck.6" "It may
well be doubted, whether the nature of society and of government
does not prescribe some limits to the legislative power; and if any
be prescribed, where are they to be found, if the property of an
individual, fairly and honestly acquired, may be seized without com-
pensation ?69
Up to that day, we had thought, as Justice McReynolds cogently
stated: "The Fifth Amendment limits all governmental powers.""'
If it does not, what limitation is there on the powers of Congress?
It may not bother many people today, if Congress under its power,
for example, "to establish post-offices and post-roads,"71 may take
the property of its citizens without due process of law, and without
just compensation. If Congress, in exercising its power under
article I, section 8, as it did in the joint resolution nullifying the
gold clauses, can ignore the fifth amendment, why can it not ignore
the amendment in exercising all of the eighteen powers delegated to
it by the states in article I, section 8?
If Congress can ignore the fifth amendment as it respects prop-
erty rights, perhaps many more people will be concerned today if it
follows therefrom that Congress can in exercising its delegated
powers also ignore the fifth amendment as it respects life and liberty.
If Congress under its power to coin money and regulate the value
thereof can ignore the fifth amendment, why can it not in regulating
commerce ignore not only the fifth amendment as to life and liberty,
"Norman v. Baltimore & O.RR., 294 U.S. 240 (1935).67Id. at 372.
"10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
"Id. at 135.
' Norman v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 294 U.S. 240, 372 (1935) (dissenting
opinion).
' U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
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but also every other provision of every one of those amendments
which constitute the Bill of Rights?
Property owners do have some chance in those areas of statutory
enactments, for at least a law, a statute, must be enacted. Property
owners do have the opportunity to endeavor to convince their elected
representatives in their state legislatures or the Congress to honor
their rights.
C. Effect of Judicial Decisions
Serious as the destruction of property rights by statutes, state
and federal, and judicial construction thereof is, there is an area in
which the destruction is even more serious. That area is the one
in which the federal courts, in the absence of a statute, construe
the Constitution so as to authorize or forbid acts of individuals
which affect the rights of other citizens. A glaring example of the
use of the judicial power in that area was the decision of the Supreme
Court with respect to covenants restricting the sale of real estate.In 1921, a group of white people in the city of Washington
owning residences on "S" Street between 18th Street and New
Hampshire Avenue executed an agreement in which they covenanted
with one another that no part of this property should be used by,
or sold or leased to any person of the Negro race. Among the
contracting parties were Buckley and Corrigan. In 1922, Corrigan,
knowing one Curtis to be a Negro, agreed to sell her part of the
property. Buckley sought to enjoin the conveyance. Corrigan
moved to dismiss the bill alleging the contract or covenant was
violative of the Constitution. The motion was overruled. The
Supreme Court affirmed because the individuals in so agreeing
deprived no one of any constitutional right."2
Time marched on. Someone conceived the idea that while there
might be no constitutional invalidity in the contracts per se; while
they might be perfectly legal and within the rights of the property
owners, when and if a state court sought to enforce them, there
arose state action which was forbidden by the fourteenth amend-
ment. Chief Justice Vinson, and Justices Black, Frankfurter,
Douglas, Murphey and Burton so held.7"
Of what value, of what reality is a valid property right if the
citizen cannot call upon the courts of his state to protect it? Does
Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926).
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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a citizen really have a property right he must enforce and protect
personally without the right of resort to the courts?
It has been thought amongst English speaking people for many,
many centuries that a man's home was his castle. A man has a
right to say that he wants no one of a certain race or religion to
come into his home. Suppose one of that race or religion persists in
coming into his home, and he asks for police protection. If the
police come, and lead the intruder away, is the fourteenth amend-
ment violated? If so, there are no rights of property in what was
once a "castle."
The hypothesis is not far fetched.
The Town of Irvington, New Jersey, enacted an ordinance re-
quiring persons intending to canvass, solicit, distribute circulars or
call from house to house to receive a written permit from the Chief
of Police. The Supreme Court held that ordinance to be unconstitu-
tional as abridging freedom of speech and the press as applied to
a member of a Bible and tract society certified to be one of Jehovah's
Witnesses distributing booklets from house to house and soliciting
contributions.74
Those who prepared and adopted the first and fifth amendments
would probably be shocked if they, like Rip Van Winkle, could
return and learn what construction had done to their handiwork.
I daresay they would wonder what had become of the right of
privacy, the right of a man and his family to be secure in their own
home from door-knockers and bell-ringers and other intruders.
In the case just cited the person who attacked the ordinance "called
from house to house in the town at all hours of the day and night
and showed to the occupants a so-called testimony and identification
card signed by the society. 7 5  If she had.the right to disturb a
family in its abode at any hour of the day and night, why has
not a member of the NAACP or the Ku Klux Klan the same right,
or the Anti-Defamation League, or the Knights of Columbus or the
WCTU or the American Civil Liberties Union, or any one of the
myriads of "societies" which thrive today? And if each of them
have that right, and exercise it when they choose, what has become
of a property owner's right to be let alone-to enjoy the peace,
comfort and security of his home, protected therein by the law?
In 1937, the Supreme Court upheld what to me is another in-
*" Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
75 Id. at 158.
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vasion of property rights. 6 A statute of Wisconsin provided that
"peaceful picketing" or patrolling, whether engaged in singly or in
numbers, should be legal. Prior to this time when ex-President Taft
was Chief Justice of the United States, he had written for the
majority in Truax v. Corrigan77 stating: "Plaintiff's business is
a property right ... and free access for employees, owner and cus-
tomers to his place of business is incident to such right."" When
the Wisconsin statute came to be considered by the Supreme Court,
that established legal principle was "distinguished." In a 5 to 4
decision, the Court held substantially that annoyance to a property
owner as a result of peaceful picketing and truthful publicity carried
on was not an invasion of the rights of the property owner.
Thus the wind was sowed. And the whirlwind has been reaped,
because if there can be any such thing as peaceful picketing, it will
not long remain peaceful. For all picketing is coercive in its nature.
If an aim is legal, if a person has a right he has a remedy, and that
remedy is in the courts of the land. If a citizen has a legal right
to induce another citizen to perform a certain act, the courts will
command the performance. If the citizen has not the legal right to
induce another to perform an act, he should not be permitted to
force the performance by any character of coercive act, whether it
be denominated "peaceful," or "non-violent," or what not. Picket-
ing or demonstrating which aims to compel the performance of an
act which those picketing or demonstrating have no legal right to
compel is an invasion of the rights of the property owner.
Justice Brandeis in the case just cited considered the phrase
"peaceful picketing" to imply not only absence of violence, but ab-
sence of any unlawful act. Said he: "It precludes the intimidation
of customers. It precludes any form of physical obstruction or inter-
ference with the plaintiff's business.1 79
Justice Brandeis would be shocked, too, if he could return and
learn what is being done today under the guise of "peaceful picket-
ing." He would be shocked if he could see the wind he sowed
converted into the whirlwind of "sit-ins," "wade-ins," "pray-ins,"
and "chain-ins" being practiced today.8"
" Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468 (1937).
'257 U.S. 312 (1921).
78 Id. at 327.
" Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468, 479 (1937).
"0 When "sit-downs" were first practiced, the Supreme Court said: "Nor
is it questioned that the seizure and retention of respondent's property were
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IV. THE PRESENT
People of the North, East and West are beginning to learn what
we of the South have long known: "Tradition and the habits of a
community count for more than logic."'" Persons operating a
hotel, a motel, a restaurant, a barber shop, a hairdressing establish-
ment, any other business rendering personal services in the South,
know that the traditions and habits of the community are such that
customers of the two races cannot be served indiscriminately in them.
When integration commences, disintegration does likewise. The
right of a property owner voluntarily to operate his business in
accordance with the traditions and habits of a community is a right
of property. There is nothing in the fourteenth amendment which
deprives the property owner of that right. Yet case after case
decided during the period 1961-1963 reveal a tendency on the part
of the court to compel the property owner to ignore the traditions
and customs of the community.
2
Not yet has the court questioned the long established rule
that the fourteenth amendment reaches only state action. To this
fact, Mr. Justice Harlan alluded in his concurring and dissenting
opinions of May 20, 1963.3 Then he uttered words which give
hope to those of us who believe that some rights of private property
are, too, within the protection of the Constitution. Said he:.
And it [the Court] does not suggest that such action, denying
equal protection, may be found in the mere enforcement of tres-
pass laws in relation to private business establishments from which
the management, of its own free will, has chosen to exclude per-
sons of the Negro race. Judicial enforcement is of course state
action, but this is not the end of the inquiry. The ultimate sub-
stantive question is whether there has been "state action of a
particular character" . . . whether the character of the State's
involvement in an arbitrary discrimination is such that it should
be held responsible for the discrimination.
This limitation on the scope of the prohibitions of the Four-
teenth Amendment serves several vital functions in our system.
Underlying the cases involving an alleged denial of equal protec-
unlawful. It was a high-handed proceeding without shadow of legal right."
NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 252 (1939).
" Laurel Hill Cemetery v. San Francisco, 216 U.S. 358, 366 (1910).
82 E.g., Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963); Shuttlesworth v.
Birmingham, 373 U.S. 262 (1963); Peterson v. Greenville, 373 U.S. 244
(1963); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961).
"' Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 249 (1963).
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tion by ostensibly private action is a clash of competing constitu-
tional claims of a higher order: liberty and equality. Freedom of
the individual to choose his associates or his neighbors, to use
and dispose of his property as he sees fit, to be irrational, arbi-
trary, capricious, even unjust in his personal relations are things
all entitled to a large measure of protection from governmental
interference. This liberty would be overridden, in the name
of equality, if the strictures of the Amendment were applied to
governmental and private action without distinction. Also in-
herent in the concept of state action are values of federalism,
a recognition that there are areas of private rights upon which
federal power should not lay a heavy hand and which should
properly be left to the more precise instruments of local au-
thority."8 4
In the area of sit-ins and other like trespasses there is hope for
property rights if the caveat of Mr. Justice Harlan is heeded.
V. CONCLUSION
Without making any accusations against any one, I place the
happenings of the last thirty years in the area of property rights by
the side of one of the few legal definitions of "Communism" which
I have found:
"Communism," [is defined as] .... "A system of social
organization in which goods are held in common; the opposite
of the system of private property . . . Communalism .... Any
theory or system of social organization involving common owner-
ship of the agents of production, and some approach to equal
distribution of the products of industry . . . ." "A theory of
government and social order according to which property and the
instruments of production are held as a common trust and the
profits arising from all labor devoted to the general good: ....
'[T]he theory which teaches that the labor and the income of
society should be distributed equally among all its members by
some constituted authority.'. . . A doctrine or practise call-
ing for the complete abolition of all private property of every
description, and the absolute control by the community in all
matters pertaining to labor, religion, social relations, etc .... ,,5
In March, 1895, there was argued before the Supreme Court
of the United States, Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co.,88 in-
" Id. at 249-50. (Emphasis added in part.)
" United States v. Hautau, 43 F. Supp. 507, 509 (D.C.N.J. 1942). (Em-
phasis added.)
157 U.S. 429 (1895).
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volving the constitutionality of an act of Congress passed August
15, 1894,17 imposing an income tax. Among counsel for those attack-
ing the act was Mr. Joseph H. Choate. In his argument he said:
I believe there are private rights of property here to be pro-
tected; that we have a right to come to this court and ask for
their protection, and that this court has a right, without asking
leave of the Attorney General or of any counsel, to hear our plea.
The act of Congress which we are impugning before you is com-
munistic in its purposes and tendencies, and is defended here
upon principles as communistic, socialistic-what shall I call
them-populistic as ever have been addressed to any political
assembly in the world. 88
Mr. Choate's plea was prophetic.
Those who scoff at "property rights" might well bear in mind
the admonition of the late President Abraham Lincoln:
Property is the fruit of labor; property is desirable; it is a
positive good in the world. That some should be rich shows that
others may become rich, and hence is just encouragement to
industry and enterprise. Let not him who is houseless pull down
the house of another, but let him work diligently, and build one
for himself, thus by example assuring that his own shall be safe
from violence when built.8 9
", Ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509.157 U.S. at 522.
817 BASLEP, CoucTED WoRKs or ABRAHAm LINCOLN 259-60 (1953).
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